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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost since the birth of modem class action procedure in 1966,
the device has attracted champions, who laud it as "one of the most socially
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useful remedies in history," and critics, who pillory it as "legalized
blackmail."' As with most concepts that elicit such pointed disagreement,
the truth lies somewhere in the middle.2 At its best, a class action
facilitates the vindication of small claims that otherwise would go
unredressed merely because of their small size in relation to litigation
costs. 3 But this move toward convenience and economy comes at a price:
"the ability to aggregate large numbers of litigants tends to shift the focus
from the client to the lawyer, from actual damages to attorneys' fees, and
from actual litigation to settlement.
Perhaps nowhere is this tension more
evident than in the discussions and decisions surrounding Rule 23(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for class actions
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.'
This Article examines Rule
23(b)(2) class actions and the conflicts that arise when the relief sought is a
"4

matter of taste or belief-i.e., a matter that cannot be resolved with
reference to neutral and objective criteria.6

Along the way, we will

consider the impact that the United States Supreme Court's most recent
class-action decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,7 is likely to have on
practice under Rule 23(b)(2).8
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE
Class actions gain their legitimacy from principles of judicial
economy and efficiency. 9 These principles animate Rule 23, but-as with
I

JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, 545-46

(2d ed. 1988) (quoting

Abraham L. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 25 BUS. LAW. 1259, 1259 (1970) and Milton Handler, The Shiftfrom Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suit The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971)).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 3-4 (describing benefits and drawbacks of class actions).
3 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shunts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions ... permit the
plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.").
4 LANDERS, supra note 1, at 546-47.
5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (permitting class actions where injunctive or declaratory relief
appropriate for class as whole).
6 See infra Part III (discussing conflicts arising from Rule 23(b)(2) class action seeking relief
not resolved through impartial standards).
7 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
8 See infra Part III (discussing Wal-MartStores, Inc. v. Dukes decision).
9 See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982) (denying class certification
because named plaintiff's claim not typical of class). In Falcon, the court held that the named
plaintiff's claim of intentional employment discrimination was not typical of the class and, thus,
maintaining a bifurcated suit would not "advance 'the efficiency and economy of litigation which
is a principal purpose of the procedure."' Id. (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538, 553 (1974)); see also 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02
(3d ed. 1997) ("The class action device was designed to promote judicial efficiency and to
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all abstract statements of purpose-disagreements abound over their
application in concrete instances. 10 Nonetheless, Rule 23 is loaded with
standards that provide at least some guidance." Specifically, a court may
not certify a class unless it finds that the prerequisites set out in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and at least one subsection of Rule 23(b)
have been met.' 2 The requirements of Rule 23(a) are commonly referred to
as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.' 3
Rule 23(a) provides in pertinent part:
*

"the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable ....
,'4 Practicality of

joinder depends on the size of the class, ease of
identifying its members and determining their
addresses, facility of making service on them if
joined, and their geographic dispersion. 5
To
satisfy Rule 23(a)(1), joinder of all parties need
only be impractical, not impossible. 6

* "there [be] questions of law or fact common to the
class.' 7 Commonality is satisfied when at least
one issue's resolution "will affect all or a
provide aggrieved persons a remedy when individual litigation is economically unrealistic ... .
10 Compare Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The policy at
the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action ....
), with Andrews v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1025 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Rule 23 is to be applied flexibly, the
manageability problems [here] defeat the Rule's underlying purposes and render these claims
inappropriate for class treatment."). See generally MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, 23.03 ("Courts
do not agree on the proper standards for construing Rule 23's requirements for class action suits.).
11 See generallyFED. R. Civ. P. 23 (outlining class action certification requirements).
12 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (denying class settlement
certification for asbestos-related injuries). The court held that because class members suffered
different types of injuries and a broad range of symptoms, Rule 23's typicality and commonality
requirements were not satisfied. Id.
13 See id. at 613 (describing Rule 23 prerequisites to class certification).
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
15

Compare Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (denying certification

because proposed class consisted of thirty-one ascertainable members living in compact
geographical area), with Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 502 (W.D. Tex. 1992)
(certifying class of over 2000 geographically-dispersed members because joinder not practicable).
16 See Slanina v. William Penn Parking Corp., 106 F.R.D. 419, 423-24 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
(finding twenty-five members satisfies numerosity even though joinder possible because
individuals justifiably feared reprisal); Republic Nat'l Bank of Dall. v. Denton & Anderson Co.,
68 F.R.D. 208, 213 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (finding joinder impracticable for class with over forty
potential members residing in eleven different states).
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
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"For this reason, the threshold of

'commonality' is not high."' 19

*

"the claims or defenses of the representative parties

[be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class
.... ,,20
Although the inquiry into typicality is
case-specific, its test often has more bite than that
used to assess commonality. 2'
The typicality
requirement cannot be satisfied unless a plaintiffs

claims arise out of the same event or course of
conduct as the class members' claims and are
based on the same legal theories.22 At a minimum,
then, proposed representatives must belong to the
class and share the same interest and injury as the

class members.2 3
* "the

representative

parties

will

fairly

and

1 Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Stewart v.
Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335 (5th Cir. 1982)) (certifying ERISA class and finding common issues as
to whether defendant violated ERISA's nonforfeiture provisions); see also Durrett v. John Deere
Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 558 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (finding commonality satisfied because action arose
out of plaintiffs' virtually identical contracts with defendant); Republic Nat 'l
Bank, 68 F.R.D. at
215 ("The true test [of commonality] is whether common or individual questions will be the
object of most of the efforts of the litigants and the Court.").
19 Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1106 (quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th
Cir. 1986)) (commonality met despite differing interests and claims of various plaintiffs).
20 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
21 Compare Forbush, 994 F.2d at 1106 ("The test for typicality, like commonality, is not
demanding ....
"),and Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Allegations
of similar discriminatory employment practices .. .satisfy the commonality and typicality
requirements of Rule 23(a)."), and Durrett, 150 F.R.D. at 558 (finding commonality and
typicality met for claims arising out of same form contract), with Byes v. Telecheck Recovery
Servs., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 421, 424-25 (E.D. La. 1997) (denying certification despite commonality
because lack of typicality where not all class members banned the same). See 1 NEWBERG ON
CLASS ACTIONS § 3:13 (4th ed. 2011) (describing overlap between commonality and typicality).
Although commonality and typicality often overlap, while a finding of typicality necessarily
entails commonality, a finding of commonality only probably entails typicality. Id.
22 Durrett, 150 F.R.D. at 558 ("To meet the typicality requirement, the putative class
representatives must establish the bulk of the elements of each class members' claims when they
prove their own.").
23 Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)) (finding
representatives claims "typical if not identical" to class claims when based on form contracts); see
also E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v.Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977) (finding
insufficient typicality because class representatives did not suffer discriminatory practices
suffered by qualified drivers).
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24

Adequacy requires an inquiry into the zeal and
competence of the representative's counsel and
into the class representative's "willingness and
ability" to actively participate in the litigation to

ensure

the

interests

of the

absentee

class

members.25 This entails two inquiries, one focused

on the named plaintiff, one on counsel:
a

The primary issue in determining whether

a named class representative is adequate is

"whether any antagonism exists between
the interests of the named plaintiffs and
those of the remainder of the class. 26 The
typicality and adequacy analyses for class
certification overlap in this area.2 7
Specifically, to the extent that the named
plaintiff satisfies the typicality requirement
by demonstrating that his claims are the
same as those of the putative class, he

takes some steps towards establishing a
lack of conflict between himself and the

putative class. 28 But, as we will see below,

23(a)(4).

24

FED. R. Civ. P.

25

Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 484 (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth

Circuit held that the adequacy requirement was satisfied because of the class counsel's zeal in
prosecuting the appeal and the named plaintiff's willingness to become familiar with the
complaint. Id.
26 Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Snell, 847 S.W.2d 367, 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (finding adequacy
because no antagonism when common lease interest exists between representatives and class
members); see also Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 502 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding
representative adequate when treated similarly as class members and no conflicts with class);
Gibb v. Delta Drilling Co., 104 F.R.D. 59, 75-79 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (identifying no antagonism
between current and former shareholders because liability independent of shareholder status);
Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co., 78 F.R.D. 507, 512 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (resolving antagonism by
bifurcating trial when issue of liability applies to all class members).
27 Horton, 690 F.2d at 485 n.27 (noting antagonism analyzed under typicality or adequacy
but expressing preference for analysis under adequacy); Longden v. Sunderman, 123 F.R.D. 547,
557 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (finding no antagonism because interests of representatives and class
members coincided and were typical); see also NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 3:13 (discussing
overlap and citing additional sources).
28 Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 994 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding
representative adequate despite different pension plans because defendant's general practices
applicable to entire class); Longden, 123 F.R.D. at 557-58 (finding adequacy despite factual
differences because defendant's conduct uniformly fraudulent and all members suffered harm).
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the analysis does not end here.29
a

The named plaintiff must also show that he
has employed counsel able to prosecute
the action vigorously to a successful
conclusion. 0 Additionally, the plaintiffs
counsel must have no conflicts with the
interests of the class and must have the
resources to devote to prosecution of the
class action, so that the due process rights
of the class members are protected. 3'

Rule 23(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against
individual class members would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with
respect to individual class members that would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class
members that, as a practical matter, would be
dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the individual adjudications or would
substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or

29

See infra Part III.C (discussing whether class certification appropriate).

30 Horton, 690 F.2d at 484 (recognizing counsel's zeal and competence, even if questionable

at outset, established through prosecution of appeal); Boos v. AT&T, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 319, 323
(W.D. Tex. 2008) (determining counsel sufficiently adequate because previously represented
class with virtually identical claim).
31 Horton, 690 F.2d at 484 (verifying zeal and confidence of plaintiffs' counsel); Longden,
123 F.R.D. at 558 (finding counsel adequate despite dropping claims against some defendants

because decision within counsel's discretion).
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(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that

a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy
32

This Article focuses on the second of these three options: viz.,
class actions primarily seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and, even
more tightly, on those actions in which the efficacy and desirability of the

requested relief is a matter of debate amongst members of the putative
class.33

III. THE SCOPE OF RULE 23(B) CLASS ACTIONS
The textual simplicity of Rule 23(b)(2) belies its underlying
complexity. Historically Rule 23(b)(2) was "designed specifically for civil
rights cases seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a numerous
and often unascertainable or amorphous class of persons . . . .,,3 A
paradigmatic case of this type might turn, for example, on a claim that a
public facility unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race.35 In such a
case, it would likely be impossible to identify everyone who had actually
suffered past injury, and the true aim of the suit would be to ensure future
non-discriminatory access to the facility via injunctive or declaratory

32

FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (2), (3).

If the court determines that an action fulfills the

requirements of all three subsections of Rule 23(b), itwould most likely order that the suit be
maintained as a class action under Rules 23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2) (rather than under (b)(3)): A
mandatory class action is seen as preferable because there is no risk that individual members will
opt out of the class and pursue separate litigation that might prejudice other class members or the
defendant. MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, 23.40(3).
33 See infra Part III.C (describing relevant factors for considering appropriateness of
certifying Rule 23(b) class actions).
34 NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 4:11; see Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d
657, 670 (Tex. 2004) ("The members of a (b)(2) class are generally bound together through
'preexisting or continuing legal relationships' or by some significant common traits such as race
or gender.") (quoting Comment, Notice in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief:
Johnsonv. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1236, 1252-53 (1980)).
35 See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971) (determining whether city
council closed public pools in whole or in part to avoid desegregation); Hernandez v. Woodard,
714 F. Supp. 963, 970 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (considering unlawful discrimination claimed by AfricanAmerican class when city closed public pools to avoid integration); Willie v.Harris Cnty., 202 F.
Supp. 549, 554-55 (S.D. Tex. 1962) (arguing county discriminated against African-American
class by denying access to public park).
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relief.3 6 The language of the Rule is not, however, limited to claims of this
sort, and much of the case law may be seen as (often conflicting) efforts to
stake its bounds.37
According to a leading commentator, two forces have contributed
to (b)(2)'s popularity and expansion.38 First, the possibility of (often
substantial) attorney's fees awards has encouraged counsel to "act as
private attorneys general in advancing important public policy."3 9 Second,
many courts enlarged the conceptual scope of (b)(2) classes by allowing
classes to seek monetary relief that is "ancillary" to the claimed injunctive
or declaratory relief 40 For these and perhaps other reasons, (b)(2) class
actions are now the most commonly brought. 4' But this expansion in scope
has come at an associated theoretical cost: namely, that there are very few
(if any) bright-line rules to guide courts and litigants as they assess the
certifiability of many contested class actions. This Article examines this
problem and develops a few standard tools for separating certifiable sheep
from uncertifiable goats.
As a threshold matter, we must pause to consider the United States
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on the subject. 42 In WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court was called upon to consider whether a
class action can be so large that it smothers typical notions of justice and
due process of law.43 Specifically, the case took up the question whether
hundreds of thousands of female Wal-Mart employees could pursue a
class-action discrimination suit. 44 As it stood after certification by the
district court (and affirmance by the Ninth Circuit), the case was, according
to the Supreme Court, "one of the most expansive class actions ever., 45 At
the outset, the Court emphasized the unwieldy nature of the class by
drawing attention to Wal-Mart's different store types, scores of national

36

See Willie, 202 F. Supp. at 554-55 (allowing class action based on racial discrimination

despite Fourteenth Amendment protecting individual personal rights). The court reasoned that
even though Fourteenth Amendment protections are individual, the park's segregation harmed an
entire class of individuals and as such was a proper basis for a class action seeking injunctive
relief to stop the discriminatory practices. Id.
37 See NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 4:11 (noting claims can range from civil rights to
environmental and other types of litigation).
38 Id.; see also id. § 4:14.
39 Id.§ 4:11 & n.25; see also id. § 4:14.
40 Id. § 4:11.
41 id.
42 See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text (analyzing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes

decision).
43 See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011) (stating issue before Court).
44 Id.at 2547.
41 See id.
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and regional divisions, thousands of stores, and over one million employees
spread over many job classifications.46 As a technical matter of procedure,
the Court examined the record facts and the theories of recovery advanced
within the framework of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).
The Court made two broad pronouncements. 48 First, the Court held
that the named plaintiffs failed to raise even a single common question that
was significant for purposes of Rule 23(a). 49 According to Justice Scalia,
the plaintiffs had to show that every class member "suffered the same
injury," which entails claims that depend on a "common contention."50
"That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is
capable of classwide resolution-which means that determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each
one of the claims in one stroke."'" In the context of the Dukes case, the
Court held that proof that one woman suffered discrimination would prove
nothing as to the next, thus evincing a lack of commonality.5 2 This
holding-although hotly disputed on the facts-should not prove terribly
controversial as a definitional statement because most courts and observers
have always opined that a truly "common" question is one that, when
answered for one class member, is answered for all. 53
For purposes of our discussion, the Court's unanimous holding that
the Dukes plaintiffs' claims could not be certified under (b)(2) is the more
important, especially given the majority and concurring opinions' differing
approaches to the issues presented.5 4 All the Justices agreed that a (b)(2)
class cannot be certified where the plaintiffs seek monetary relief that is not
purely incidental to the entry of an injunction or declaration." This is so
because (b)(2) "does not authorize class certification when each class

46

47
48

See id.(noting Wal-Mart is largest private employer in U.S.).
See id, at 2548-50 (analyzing basis for court's holding).
See infra text accompanying notes 49-53 (announcing and explaining Court's holding).

49 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551-52 (2011).
50 Id. at 2551.
51

Id.

52 See id.at 2552 ("Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for [employment]

decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all of the class members'
claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.").
53 See Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-59 (1982) (finding no commonality
where representative claimed intentional discrimination but class members claim disparate
impact); NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 3:10-12 (considering common questions of law or fact
requirements).
54 See Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2555 (announcing majority holding); id.
at 2565-67 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part) (agreeing Rule 23(b)(2) certification improper).
" See id.at 2557-59 (majority) (holding claims for monetary relief may not be certified

under Rule 23(b)); id.at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part) (agreeing with majority's
certification denial because monetary relief not incidental to injunctive or declaratory relief).
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member would be entitled to an individualized award of money
damages." 56 The open question, post-Dukes, is what level of commonality
will be required in all class actions, including especially (b)(2) actions.57
As discussed below, some courts have required (b)(2) classes to be
"cohesive," which some have argued is akin to the "predominance"
requirement of (b)(3). 58 The Dukes majority did not take this precise tack,
but it did state that "[d]issimilarities within the proposed class" can
"impede the generation of common answers."5 9 In so doing, according to
Justice Ginsburg, the majority essentially smuggled (b)(3)'s predominance
and superiority standards into (a)(2), which works as a practical matter to
collapse all class actions into a common framework.60 It thus remains to be
seen whether the lower courts will all migrate to a fairly robust standard of
commonality in all class actions and adopt some version of the
cohesiveness test that we will soon examine. 61
In addition to the matters of scope put to rest in Dukes, we must
also consider matters of subject: viz., is a class action appropriate-or the
most appropriate-method of resolving a particular dispute? 62 To that
subject we now turn.
A. Are There More Appropriate or Efficient Ways to Litigate the Claims
Alleged?
If efficiency is the conceptual hallmark of the class action device,
then a court must consider at the outset whether any particular case is likely
to serve those ends in light of all available options. There are, of course,
myriad ways to define and measure "efficiency," but one ready shorthand
is an evaluation of litigation costs. 63 In other words, a court should ask

56 Id. at 2557 (majority).
57 See infra Part III.C.2 (assessing level of commonality required before certification

appropriate).
" See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing cohesion and conflicts among class members).
59 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (quoting Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 97, 131-32

(2009) (stressing importance of common answers, rather than common questions, in class
certification).
60 Id. at 2566-67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (noting "dissimilarities" inquiry developed
in Rule 23(b)(3) context). Justice Ginsburg argues that the majority's emphasis on dissimilarities
within the proposed class "mimics" Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance inquiry. Id. at 2566.
61 See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing cohesiveness requirements to ensure no class

antagonism).

62 See infra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing appropriateness of proceeding as class action versus
derivative action).
63 See Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 229, 248 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ("A class action
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whether (and the named plaintiff must show that) a class action would
reduce litigation costs. 64 This evaluation should be made in light of other
available options, two of which warrant detailed discussion.
1. Should the Case Be a Derivative Action?

Some (b)(2) class actions aim to modify corporate conduct or
policies on behalf of shareholders. 65 A threshold question thus emerges:

are the claims derivative or direct? 66 In a derivative action, a corporate
shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation to redress a wrong committed

against the corporation that the corporation's management has not
pursued.67 The gravamen of this type of claim is an alleged injury to the

corporation that causes "derivative" injury to the suing shareholder and all
other shareholders. 68 Thus, "the alleged injury must affect all the
shareholders by virtue of their status as collective owners of the

corporation.,

69

Claims for waste or mismanagement provide a recurring

example of this type of suit, especially given that one reason that a
corporation would be unlikely to pursue such claims is that managers of the
corporation necessarily participated in the alleged wrongdoing.70
If the claims are derivative, then a class action is at least arguably a
disfavored approach because derivative actions exist, in significant part, to
prevent "strike suits" and weed out spurious claims (which are sometimes
brought by a corporate shareholder with a personal ax to grind or a political

may be superior where 'class-wide litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs and
promote greater efficiency."') (quoting Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234
(9th Cir. 1996)).
64 See Maddock, 248 F.R.D. at 248 (requiring class proponent to demonstrate class action as
superior method of adjudication). Many other courts have also held that the plaintiff carries the
certification burden. See, e.g., Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund,
579 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2009) (charging party seeking certification with burden of proof); In
re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)) (same); Henry Schein Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 693 (Tex.
2002) (considering whether plaintiffs have met certification burden).
65 See infra text accompanying notes 120-27127.
66 See Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1995) (addressing whether
ERISA claim should be maintained as derivative suit or class action).
67 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, 23.1.02 (defining derivative action).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1419-21 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering
derivative action for gross mismanagement by defendant bank as brought by the bank's
depositors); In re Cray Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1116-17 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (addressing
derivative claims of gross mismanagement and waste brought by shareholders); see also MOORE
ET AL., supra note 9, 23.1.02 (describing examples of derivative actions).
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agenda to advance) before the corporation is put to the enormous expense
of litigation, especially class litigation. 71 Accordingly, derivative rules
typically require that the plaintiff-before suing derivatively-make

demand on the corporation to sue directly, verify pleadings under oath, and
plead certain aspects of its case with particularity.7 2 These rules also
provide for neutral investigation, respect for the business judgment of
officers and directors, and fee shifting. 73 For example, a plaintiff might
complain that a corporation's election procedures are flawed. A court's
first order of business, then, would be to determine whether a class action
or a derivative action best serves the ends ofjudicial and party economy. 74
To answer this question, a court should look at the various
(sometimes conflicting) tests that courts have developed to distinguish
direct from derivative claims. For example, for a member of a corporate
entity "to assert a direct action against a corporate fiduciary, she must have
been injured 'directly or independently of the corporation .....
The test to
distinguish between derivative and direct harm is whether the plaintiff
suffered a 'special injury."' 7 1 Under this line of thinking, a plaintiff cannot
show "special injury" when complaining of election procedures unless her

"individual vote[] w[as] invalidated," because "[t]he right to fair and
reasonable election procedures inures to the benefit of all members,
and ... a director's interference with elections does not constitute a
separate and distinct injury creating a right of direct action in an individual

71

See Smithy. Ayres, 977 F.2d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating derivative plaintiff must not

have ulterior motives or advance personal agenda); see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 9,
23.1.05 ("The verification requirement was designed to discourage strike suits, in which
complaints are filed without regard to their truth in order to coerce corporate managers to
settle.").
72 There are two dimensions to these rules: one substantive, one procedural. The substantive
aspects are usually found in state corporation laws. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT.R. ANN. 23.1 (West
2010) (following for the most part FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1); TEx. Bus. ORG. CODE §§ 21.551-.563
(2010) (following MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2005)); In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 45558 (Tex. 2009) (specifying what such a demand must include under Texas law). The procedural
aspects are often contained in rules of civil procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (describing
procedural prerequisites and pleading requirements of derivative actions).
73 See TEx. Bus. ORG. CODE §§ 21.551-563 (setting forth standards for derivative suits).
74 Compare Wixonv. Wyndam Resort Dev. Co., No. C 07-02361-JSW, 2008 WL 1777494,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2008) (concluding claims based on "actions to manipulate the election
process" are derivative, not direct), with Lapidus v. Hecht, 232 F.3d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding standing to assert individual claims where shareholder alleges conduct harming
contractual voting rights), and In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 486
n.84 (Del. Ch.2000) (finding directors' defensive takeover measures reasonable because court
previously granted certification on complaint's alleged facts).
75 Paskowitz v. Wohlstadter, 822 A.2d 1272, 1277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (citations
omitted) (quoting Kramerv. W. Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348, 352 (Del. 1988)).
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member., 76 Indeed, a plaintiff in such a case lacks "standing to assert a
direct action on behalf of [others]." 77
2. Is a Class Action Necessary?
At least in theory, a declaratory judgment or injunction action by a
single plaintiff could achieve the same result as a class action. And since

the class device necessarily adds a layer of complexity and associated cost
to any action, a court should at least consider whether a class action is
indeed necessary.78 For example, if a plaintiff seeks broad, absolute
injunctive relief that affects numerous individuals, then certification of a
class may be of little practical import.79 Suppose a plaintiff sues to block
construction of a road through a swamp because it will interfere with his
ability to fish. If the plaintiff's suit is successful and the road is never built,
then not only he but all other fishermen will benefit, with or without
certification of a class. (But, as we'll see in a minute, the matter becomes
rather more complicated when the number of competing interests begins to
multiply.)
In analyzing whether certification is needed on the facts of any
given case, the answers to several questions should guide the decision.
First, would a declaration or an injunction obtained by a single plaintiff
accrue to the benefit of all putative class members? This would seem to be
the case whenever the challenged conduct is that of a government agency
Dunnv. Ceccarelli, 489 S.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
Another way to articulate this distinction is with resort to the "internal affairs"
doctrine i.e., claims that relate solely to the internal affairs of a corporation are derivative, not
direct. See Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 916 F.2d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying
internal affairs doctrine and finding claims derivative, not direct); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(d)(9)(B) (2006) (excluding certain "internal affairs" cases from Class Action Fairness Act's
expanded jurisdiction).
78 See, e.g., Ali v. Quarterman, No. 9:09-CV-52, 2009 WL 1586691, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June
4, 2009) (justifying case closing because injunctive relief in pending non-class action would
provide same remedy); Access Now Inc. v. Walt Disney World Co., 211 F.R.D. 452, 455 (M.D.
Fla. 2001) (finding "complexity and expense" of class action unnecessary when injunctive relief
would provide same remedy); Fairley v. Forrest Cnty., Miss., 814 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (S.D.
Miss. 1993) (determining class action unnecessary because declaratory and injunctive relief
would have same effect); see also United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Even with the denial of class action status, the
requested injunctive and declaratory relief will benefit not only the individual appellants ... but
all other persons subject to the practice under attack."). But see Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger,
270 F.R.D. 477, 485 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting class certification not improper simply because
injunctive relief provides same remedy).
79 See Bryant G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77
Nw. U. L. REv. 492, 499 (1982) ("One person represented by a private attorney may seek broad
injunctive relief affecting numerous individuals and the public interest.").
76

77 Id.
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involving, for instance, a general policy or criteria for qualifying for a
benefit.80 Second, will the defendant agree to comply with any judgment
for declaratory of injunctive relief? Here again, the matter seems relatively

straightforward with respect to a government agency or other stable
organization. 8 ' Third, would a declaration or injunction by itself fully
resolve the matter and provide full relief, or would matters inevitably
require individual attention? For instance, a single-plaintiff declaration that
a policy is illegal might resolve that matter in theory and on a goingforward basis, but if full relief would require ancillary disgorgement or
restitution on a case-by-case basis, then the balance might well tip in favor
of certification.82
The answers to several other questions may also weigh in the
balance. Would collateral estoppel preclude a defendant from contesting
the facts established in an individual action?83 If so, the importance of the

binding effect of a class-wide judgment will be diminished. Would a single
plaintiff be able to recover her attorney's fees? (Some declaratory
judgment acts provide for the award of attorneys' fees to a successful
movantj.)4 Is the class action lawyer driven, with the recovery of

attorney's fees as the principal object of the case?85 Finally, is the delay

80 See Lincoln Cercpac v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(denying class certification deemed superfluous in action against government agency); Kan.
Health Care Ass'n, Inc. v. Kan. Dep't of Social & Rehab. Servs., 822 F. Supp. 687, 689 (D. Kan.
1993) (declaring class certification unnecessary because invalidation of Medicaid reimbursement
plan benefits all proposed class members); see also NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 4:19 (describing
cases where courts have denied Rule 23(b)(2) certification because class action unnecessary).
81 See Ruiz v. Blum, 549 F. Supp. 871, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating certification
unnecessary where court assumes public officials would apply determination to all persons
equally); see also Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1070 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting
circuit split as to whether a "need" standard exists in determining class certification); NEWBERG,
supra note 21, § 4:19 (discussing need for class action for Rule 23(b)(2) certification). But see
Disability Rights Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 239 F.R.D. 9, 23-24
(D.D.C. 2006) (noting no "necessity" requirement exists under Rule 23); 7A WRIGHT, MILLER &
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.2 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing doctrine).
82 See Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans' Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113, 119-20 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating
certification needed so class members could obtain benefits previously denied under challenged
policy); see also NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 4:19 (describing circumstances favoring Rule
23(b)(2) class certification).
83 See NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 4:29 (noting the use of offensive collateral estoppel
without mutuality of parties has affected certification determinations).
84 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009 (2010) (demonstrating declaratory judgment
that allows award of attorney's fees to successful movants).
85 See In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1122 (8th Cir. 2005) (determining class
action seeking medical monitoring inappropriate if driven by lawyer's desire for larger fee);
Bilodeau v.Webb, 170 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) ("Generally, conflicts of interest in
class actions arise amidst concerns that class counsel has been tempted to further its own interest
in securing exorbitant fees as against the interests of the class members." (citing Gen. Motors
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86
and additional expense associated with the class device worthwhile?
None of these questions should be considered as a way to determine the

outcome in every case, but they are nonetheless valuable heuristics.
B. Is the Subject Matter of the Case Appropriatefor Litigation at All?
Even in cases not involving the government, some institutional

disputes have an obvious air of "politics" about them.

Indeed, the

"business judgment rule" tacitly recognizes this fact and, accordingly, bars
judicial inquiry into the good-faith acts of corporate directors.87 There are
no bright lines to be drawn here, but the following sections aim to lay out a
few markers to help courts steer clear of cases that are not really justiciable,

as well as those that-though over the justiciability line-give rise to so
many conflicts amongst members of the putative class that certification is
inappropriate .88
C. Is a Mandatory Class Appropriate on the Facts Alleged?
Even if a court determines that an action is appropriate for
litigation and need not be adjudicated individually or derivatively, further
inquiry is needed to determine whether certification is appropriate.8 9 Two
questions typically emerge. First, is the defendant's conduct "generally
applicable" to all members of the putative class? 90 Second, is there
Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. 1996))).
86

See NEWBERG, supra note 21,

§ 5.1 ("Whether it is advantageous for the plaintiff to go the

class action route or for the defendant to oppose certification in a suit filed against it, depends on
the facts and circumstances of the case .... "). Apart from the delay and expense associated with
the class procedure itself, many procedural rules provide for interlocutory appeals and
(sometimes) mandatory stays of the entire litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (permitting appeal
of an order granting or denying class action certification); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(b) (allowing stay of trial's commencement pending resolution of appeal).
87 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (stating business judgment
rule "presumes propriety ... in a board's decisiof' once decision has been made). Although not
of course directly applicable, the "political-question" doctrine is at least roughly analogous. See
id. Under that doctrine a court will find no justiciable controversy if it cannot make a decision
without making a policy choice of a sort that is clearly within the discretion of another
government branch. See generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-100 (1968) (discussing history

of the doctrine of nonjusticiable political questions).
88 See infra Part III.C. 1-5 (analyzing factors that suggest conflict amongst class members).
89 See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (explaining questions that arise in inquiry of
whether certification appropriate).
90 See Heastie v. Cmty. Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669, 679-80 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(concluding class certification appropriate where all class members signed loan documents with
same clause); see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 9,
23.43[2][a] (outlining three-part
certification test).
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"adversity" amongst members of the putative class and, if so, is that a good
reason to deny certification? 91 The first of these questions is relatively easy
to resolve, but the second presents some of the most nettlesome difficulties
in all of complex litigation. We now take these questions in turn, with
particular attention to the second.
1. Is the Defendant's Conduct "Generally Applicable" to the Class?
The "generally applicable" standard assures that a plaintiff with a
particularized grievance or individualized claim for relief cannot
successfully invoke the class device as a litigation tactic.92 This does not

mean, however, that a defendant's acts must be directed at each member of
the class; rather, the issue is whether those acts similarly affected each
member of the class. 93 A somewhat tougher question arises when not all

members of the class have been harmed by the conduct alleged. One can
easily find decisions on either side of the issue.94 There are, nonetheless,
two commonsense limitations to help maintain order here: one qualitative,
and one quantitative. First, if all members of the class have suffered
metaphysical injury (even if they have suffered no actual damages), then

the class may be certifiable. An example of this would be an "access" case
like Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. 95 in which the named
plaintiffs sued a theater chain for violating the California Disabled Persons
Act. 96 In Arnold, the court certified the class even though the class
91 See Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating certification
improper where named plaintiffs challenged policy that some class members might approve); see
also MOORE ET AL., supra note 9,
23.25[2][b][i] (explaining identical interest of class
representative and class not required).
92 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) ("[T]he party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.").
93 See Boles v. Earl, 601 F. Supp. 737, 745 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (certifying class despite
potential conflicts because alleged government conduct affected all class members); see also
MOORE ET AL., supra note 9, 23.43 [2][a] (explaining defendant's conduct must generally apply
to all class members).
94 Compare Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (certifying narrowlydefined class despite inevitable possibility some members not hanned by defendant's conduct),
and Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 454-55 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(certifying class seeking handicap-accessible theaters even though members did not seek access
to all theaters), with Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1504 (U.S. 2010) ("[A] class should not be certified if it is apparent that it
contains a great many persons who have suffered no injury at the hands of the defendant."), and
Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (denying certification of consumerfraud class comprising all product purchasers regardless of whether deceived).
9' 158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
96 Id. at 443.
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definition was not limited to patrons of the chain and, thus, contained many
members who had no injury.97 This fact would not seem to work any great
mischief because someone who was not a current patron might be one in
the future and, in any event, the cost of compliance with respect to
unharmed class members would be de minimis, probably nil. 98 And even
in a case involving some equitable monetary relief (e.g., disgorgement,

restitution), the presence of some class members who could show no loss in
a suit for damages (because of, for example, prior recovery from a third
party), should prove no obstacle in the certification and liability phases of

the case, assuming that these members are entitled to declaratory and
injunctive relief.99
Second, and more problematic, are cases in which the class

contains a large percentage of members who have suffered neither injury
nor damages (or who cannot be determined ab initio to have suffered injury
and damages).

Commentators have identified at least three variations on

this theme. 100

First, there is the "overbroad" class, which is a class

including members who would lack standing to sue on an individual
basis. 10 Second, there is the "difficult-to-identify" class, which is a class
97 See id. at 443. This raises the question of whether a case of this type would be equally
well served by a single plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Access Now Inc. v.
Walt Disney World Co., 211 F.R.D. 452, 455 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (finding class certification
unnecessary where injunction would provide same relief to all similarly situated persons); Fairley
v. Forrest Cnty., Miss., 814 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (determining class action
unnecessary because declaratory and injunctive relief would have same effect); see also
discussion and sources cited supra Part III.A.2 (discussing whether class certification necessary
when injunction provides same remedy). In fact, the Arnold court openly acknowledged the
"extraordinary degree of homogeneity" encountered in dealing with this type of suit involving a
common pattern of discrimination. 158 F.R.D. at 452.
98 See Arnold, 158 F.R.D. at 455 ("[P]laintiffs' ADA claims challenge the same specific
design features at defendant's various theaters .... "). Because the theaters shared common
design elements, the court found it irrelevant that some class members did not suffer harm at a
particular theater. Id.
99 See George v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 338, 353 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (stating
restitution resulting from breach of fiduciary duty does not prevent certification because relief
equitable); Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 436 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (certifying
declaratory and injunctive relief despite eligibility of some members for individual statutory
relief); see also NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 2:4 (discussing standing to sue as class action).

100 See generally John H. Beisner et al., Courts Search for Class Certification "FailSafe"
Factor,
NAT'L
L.
J.,
Apr.
4,
2011,
available
at

http://www.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications2387_0.pdf (explaining types of class
actions where large percentage of members suffer no injury or damages).
101 See Oshanav. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513-14 (7th Cir. 2006) (denying certification
because consumer fraud class included all product purchasers including those not allegedly
deceived); In re McDonald's French Fries Litig., 257 F.R.D. 669, 671-72 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(holding consumer fraud class overbroad because included all purchasers regardless of exposure
to misrepresentations). But see Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010)
("While it is almost inevitable that a class will include some people who have not been injured by

18

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

defined with reference to an act or state of mind of each putative class
member. 10 2 Finally, there is the "fail-safe" class, which is a class defined
with reference to a legal conclusion. 103 There are many ways to analyze

these scenarios, but-for purposes of our discussion of Rule 23(b)(2)-the
common thread is that each is an instance in which there may be no rulerequired "conduct generally applicable to the class." 0 4
2. There Are Conflicts Among the Class and, Therefore, It Fails for
Lack of Cohesiveness
As noted above, the Dukes Court articulated a rigorous standard of
"commonality" that is designed to assure that "common" questions are
truly so in the sense of generating common answers to legally significant
questions. 05 At some level of generality, there is a conceptual overlap

between this standard and the idea that a (b)(2) class should be "cohesive."
An important aspect of the cohesiveness inquiry has been to insure not just
commonality of questions and answers, but also that the interests of the

putative class members are not adverse to each other or to those of the
named plaintiffs. 0 6 In Amchem Products, Inc. v.Windsor, 10 7 the Supreme
Court opined that a class should be "sufficiently cohesive to warrant

the defendant's conduct ... this possibility does not preclude class certification."). The issue here
seems to be quantitative: the Pella court seemed unconcerned because the class definitions in that
case did not "include a great many people who have suffered no injury." Id.; see also Beisner et
al., supra note 100 (discussing different damages among class members).
102 See Oshana v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 225 F.R.D. 575, 580-81 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (denying
certification because class members would have to know when they purchased item at issue); see
also Beisner et al., supra note 100 (recognizing possible particularity among damages).
103 See Campbell v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 68, 73 (D. Me. 2010) ("[Proposed
class definition] is problematic because it creates a 'fail-safe class,' which 'impermissibly
determines membership based upon a determination of liability."' (quoting Lewis v. First Am.
Title Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 536, 551 (D. Idaho 2010))); Kamar v. RadioShack Corp., No. 0955674, 2010 WL 1473877, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2010) ("The fail-safe appellation is simply a
way of labeling the obvious problems that exist when the class itself is defined in a way that
precludes membership unless the liability of the defendant is established."); Brazil v. Dell Inc.,
585 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying certification of purchasers of "falsely
advertised" products because class membership dependent on defendant's liability). Words in the
class definition such as "wrongfully," "negligently," or "illegally" signal the presence of a failsafe class. See Beisner et al., supra note 100 (providing further examples). This tactic is
disapproved because one does not know who is in the class until after a merits determination. Id.
Thus, if the defendant prevails, no one is in the class and no one is bound by the judgment, which
completely undermines the efficiencies associated with the class device. Id.
104 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (stating requirements for class certification).
105 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548-52 (2011); see also supra notes
49-57 and accompanying text (discussing commonality requirement).
106 See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing cohesiveness analysis).
107 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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adjudication by representation.' 08
Although the Court made this
pronouncement in connection with a discussion of Rule 23(b)(3)'s
predominance requirement, many courts apply the cohesiveness criterion to
(b)(2) classes. 0 9
As the Eighth Circuit, for example, has stated,
"[a]lthough Rule 23(b)(2) contains no predominance or superiority
requirements, class claims thereunder must still be cohesive."" 0 Other
courts have questioned this standard, noting that courts demanding
cohesiveness have "[i]n effect . . . imported the (b)(3) predominance

requirement into the (b)(2) realm, despite the fact that the Rule itself
contains no such language.""' At the end of the day, this intercourt dispute
may amount to nothing more than a disagreement over nomenclature.
Here's why.
One need look no further than the text of Rule 23(b)(2) to confirm
that it does not use the "questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate" terminology employed in Rule 23(b)(3)." 2 But just as
clearly, Rule 23(b)(2) requires that (1) the defendant has "acted . . . on

grounds that apply generally to the class," (2) "so that final injunctive relief
...is appropriate" (3) "respecting the class as a whole.""' 3 And as one
court has explicitly conceded, "[t]his three part-inquiry will often look
similar to a 'cohesiveness' determination ....

""

Two lessons emerge

"' Id. at 623.

109See, e.g., Romberio v. Unumprovident Corp., 385 Fed. App'x 423, 433 (6th Cir. 2009)
(noting "well-recognized rule that Rule 23(b)(2) classes mustbe cohesive"); Lemonv. Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the
presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous ....
);
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) ("While 23(b)(2) class actions
have no predominance or superiority requirements, it is well established that the class claims
must be cohesive.").
110In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1121 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Thompson v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 557 (D. Minn. 1999) ("Rule 23(b)(2) includes an implicit
'cohesiveness' requirement, which precludes certification when individual issues abound.");
sources cited supra note 109 (discussing Rule 23(b)(2)'s cohesive requirement).
Ul Donovanv. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2010); see also Walters
v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Although common issues must predominate for
class certification underRule 23(b)(3), no such requirement exists under 23(b)(2)."); Yaffe v.
Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972) ("[T]he existence of 'predominating' questions and
the availability of other methods of resolution which might be superior to a class action are not
criteria of a subdivision (b)(2) class, but again of a (b)(3) class .... "); Davis v. Homecomings
Fin., No. C05-1466RSL, 2006 WL 2927702, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2006) ("[T]he Ninth
Circuit has never held that 'cohesiveness' is required for a Rule 23(b)(2) class. The inquiry is not
whether common issues predominate but whether defendant has acted on grounds generally
applicable to the class.").
112 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (text available supra Part
11).

113 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
114 Donovan, 268 F.R.D. at 12 n.5.
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here. First, no matter what test is used, a putative class may not be certified
if the members are so disparately situated that injunctive relief would need
to be customized to the needs of individual members. 5 Second, even if an
injunction would apply across the board, genuine adversity among
members of the class will defeat certification under an "adequacy"
analysis-i.e.,
without
resort to a vigorous
formulation
of
"cohesiveness."" 6
3. Is the Principal Dispute "Political"?
Although much class-action litigation is brought in good faith to
achieve salutary ends, sometimes litigation is brought by a litigant

attempting to force a personal preference on an organization and-by
virtue of the class device-on all others similarly situated to him." 7 In this
type of case there is neither a clean legal issue (i.e., an issue in which the
question of whether some members of the class oppose the litigation is
irrelevant, as in a civil rights case) nor an ultimate fact of the matter (i.e., as
in a case in which members of the class have differing opinions as to
whether the litigation will confer benefits or cause harm). There are
myriad factual situations that could give rise to a case of this sort, but there
are at least two familiar patterns. In the first, a corporate shareholder
challenges a corporate decision (often a decision to merge or sell or acquire
assets)." 8 In the second, a plaintiff challenges the acts of an institutional
body (e.g., a decision of a school board).119

115

See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing need for defendant's conduct to apply generally to

class); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (requiring common
answers among class members).
116 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing adequacy requirement of class
certification and focus on both counsel and class representative). Some courts do require a
rigorous analysis of cohesiveness and a predicate "assumption of homogeneity." See Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 670 (Tex. 2004). Or, put differently, they require a
"common concern" among members of the proposed class. See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 547 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2008).
117 See Issen v. GSC Enters., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (considering
pleading of two individual shareholders for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief from
defendants); Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 393
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (filing suit by only some parents and students opposing restrictions).
118 See infra note 127 (discussing several cases of corporate decision where class
certification denied).
119 See Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming denial of
female athletes' class because of inherent conflicts between lacrosse and softball interests); Pico,
474 F. Supp. at 393 (finding potential different interests concerning book restrictions between
some students and majority of parents).
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In Issen v.GSC Enterprises,Inc. 120 a minority shareholder sued a
host of defendants for alleged securities violations committed in the course
of a "going private" merger. 12 1 The threshold question in this case asked
whether the plaintiff s claims were derivative or direct. 2 2 The court found
that-because the plaintiff claimed constructively to have sold his shares
(he did this so as to have standing to sue as a "seller" of securities under

Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act)-he was not a "shareholder"
entitled to sue derivatively. 123 But he fared no better with respect to the
putative class, which the court declined to certify. 124 To reach its decision,
the court balanced, on the one hand, the plaintiffs requested relief

(rescission) against, on the other hand, the fact that over 80% of the
putative class members had exchanged their shares under the terms of the
merger. 12 Thus, although recognizing "the strong policy favoring class
actions in securities fraud cases," the court found that the named plaintiff s
claim was not typical and that his interests did not "coincide with the bulk
of his proposed class as required by one arm of the adequacy of
representation requirement embodied in Rule 23(a)(4).', 126 The fatal flaw,
according to the court, was that the named plaintiffs preference for

rescission was not universal:

"It is unlikely that those minority

shareholders who tendered their shares nearly three years ago would now
want to rescind the merger and resume their position as minority

shareholders of [the merged corporation]
120
121

.,,127

508 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
See id.at 1282 (noting merger type allows payment of minority shareholders without

opportunity to vote on merger).
122 Id. at 1295-96 (stating issue before the court).
123 Id. at 1295.
124 Id.at 1296.
125 Issen, 508 F. Supp. at 1296.
126 Id.
127 Id. Many other courts have denied certification in this type of situation.

See, e.g.,

Birnberg v. Milk St. Residential Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, No. 02 V 0978, 2003 WL 21995177, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2003) (denying certification to rescind sold shares since two-thirds of partners
"might not wish [transaction] undone"); Hastings-Murtagh v. Tex. Air Corp., 119 F.R.D. 450,
458 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("[I]n cases of minority stockholders challenging a consummated merger,
conflicts among tendering and nontendering shareholders are commonplace .. . . [and] center
around the requested remedies."); Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 453, 462-63
(D.D.C. 1985) (denying certification based on adequacy because many proposed class members
"may" not want merger voided); Weisfeld v. Spartans Indus., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 570, 581-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (describing conflict between plaintiff seeking merger rescission and class
members who no longer hold shares); Guttmann v. Braemer, 51 F.R.D. 537, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (denying certification where potential disagreement among class members whether
rescission proper form of relief); Maynard, Merel & Co. v. Carcioppolo, 51 F.R.D. 273, 277-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (denying certification because plaintiff's injury differed from class members
who would disapprove of merger rescission); Pomierski v. W. R. Grace & Co., 282 F. Supp. 385,
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Pico v. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
DistrictNo. 26128 presents an example of the second sort: i.e., one growing
out of a clash of belief systems and attendant preferences.129 The case

arose after a self-identified "conservative" school board directed the
district's superintendent to remove a number of "objectionable" books from
the district's libraries. 30 The school board ultimately conceded that the

books were not obscene, but rather, that they were "in bad taste."' 3' Setting
aside the substantive issue of how far school boards and administrators may
go in restricting student speech and access to library works without running
afoul of the First Amendment (an issue that continues to bedevil courts to
this day), 3 2 the proceduralissue is whether a class can be certified where
members of the class have differing views as to whether something is
"vulgar, immoral, and in bad taste."' 33 In the face of "reason to believe"
that the named plaintiffs and at least some members of the putative class
sharply disagreed whether the school district should restrict access to the
subject books, the court held that the named plaintiffs' claims were not
typical and that, therefore, certification was not appropriate. 134
4. Is Injunctive or Declaratory Relief Appropriate?
A court must also ask at the threshold whether the asserted claims
are amenable to injunctive or declaratory relief That is, is the named
plaintiff complaining about something reasonably specific and, if so, can an

injunction be crafted that would satisfy the requirement of Rule 65(d) that

392 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (finding named plaintiff's interest antagonistic because many class members
would not want deal undone).
128 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev 'don other grounds, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980).
129 See id.at 389-91 (describing dispute underlying case).
130 Id. at 389-92 (noting school board identified itself as "conservative").
The
"objectionable" books included:

(1) Slaughterhouse Five (Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.); (2) The Naked

Ape (Desmond Morris); (3) Down These Mean Streets (Piri Thomas); (4) Best Short Stories by
Negro Writers (Langston Hughes, ed.); (5) Go AskAlice (Anonymous); (6) Laughing Boy (Oliver
La Farge); (7) Black Boy (Richard Wright); (8) A Hero Ain't Nothing But a Sandwich (Alice

Childress); (9) Soul on Ice (Eldridge Cleaver); (10) A Readerfor Writers (Jerome Archer, ed.);
and (11) The Fixer (Bernard Malamud). Id.at 391 n.6 (listing books removed from library at
school board's direction).
131 Id. at 392.
132

See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding school administrator could

discipline student for displaying "Bong Hits for Jesus" banner). The Court reached the decision
in a 5-4 vote. Id.at 395.
133 Pico, 474 F. Supp. at 392 (stating issue before court).
134 Id. at 393. The court also held that a class action was unnecessary. Id. ("A disposition
either way would be as effective without the procedural complexities that attend class
certification."); see supra Part III.A.2 (considering necessity of class actions).
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every injunction "state its terms specifically; and describe in reasonable
detail . . .the acts restrained or required[?]' 135 If the answer is not an
unequivocal "yes," this may signal the presence of a class that is not
cohesive and that may be brimming with different or competing (even if
not directly adverse) interests. Shook v. Board of County Commissioners
(Shook 11)136 serves as a good example. In this case, the named plaintiffs
brought an Eighth Amendment challenge against a county jail, alleging that
the conditions there with respect to prisoners with mental health issues
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 137 The district court held that
the plaintiffs had not carried their burden to show that the defendants had
acted on grounds generally applicable to the class so as to make declaratory
and injunctive relief appropriate. 138 Particularly, "the district court noted
the factual differences between the individual named plaintiffs' situations,
suggesting that because some plaintiffs were asserting claims for denial of
medication, some for lack of supervision, and others for use of excessive
force, there was no simple policy or procedure to which all were
subject.' 139 The Tenth Circuit was thus called upon to decide
whether the
0
factual differences did indeed weigh against certification.14
To answer this question,
"cohesiveness" angle, opining that

the

court

approached

from

a

[C]ohesiveness has at least two aspects. First, the class
must be sufficiently cohesive that any classwide injunctive
relief can satisfy the limitations of Federal Rule Civil
Procedure 65(d)-namely, the requirement that it "state its
terms specifically; and describe in reasonable detail ... the
act or acts restrained or required."
Second, "[a] class
action may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) if relief
specifically tailored to each class member would be
necessary to correct the allegedly wrongful conduct of the
141
defendant.'

135 See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B)-(C).

Subsections (a) & (b) of Rule 65 grant the court

power to impose preliminary injunctions after notice and hearing or ex parte temporary
injunctions. Id. Subsection (d) details the required contents and permitted scope of injunctions or
restraining orders issued under subsections (a) or (b). Id.
136 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008).
137 Id. at 602 (stating details of class action brought before district court).
138 Id. (announcing district court's denial of class certification).
139

Id. at 602-03.

Id. at 603 (stating issue before appeals court).
Shook II, 543 F.3d at 604 (quoting Monreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir.
2004); MOORE ET AL., supra note 9 23.43(2)(b).
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So, the court concluded, "if redressing the class members' injuries requires
time-consuming inquiry into individual circumstances or characteristics of
class members or groups of class members, 'the suit could become
unmanageable and little value would be gained in proceeding as a class
action. - 142 Indeed, "individual issues cannot be avoided simply by
formulating an injunction at a stratospheric level of abstraction; as we have
explained before, 'injunctions simply requiring the defendant to obey the
law are too vague to satisfy Rule 65 .-143 Cast in these terms, "under Rule

23(b)(2) the class members' injuries must be sufficiently similar that they
can be addressed14in
an single injunction that need not differentiate between
4
class members."

The Tenth Circuit held that the district court could "reasonably
conclude that the class failed to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)." 45 Specifically, the
district court correctly identified that much of the relief sought by the
plaintiffs would not be applicable to all class members.14 6 This difficulty
was not an anomaly.
Many of plaintiffs' claims either required
"downstream," individualized evidence or attempted to impose a standard

142

Id. (quoting Shook v. El Paso Cnty. (Shook 1), 386 F.3d 963, 973 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting

cases lack cohesiveness when redressing injury requires time-consuming inquiry into individual
class members). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit stated, that "it is precisely these types of
manageability issues relating to the district court's ability to provide injunctive relief to the
class framed in the complaint, a textually authorized consideration that we held permissible in
Shook L" Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Shook 1, 386 F.3d at 973 ("Elements of
manageability and efficiency are not categorically precluded in determining whether to certify a
23(b)(2) class.").
143 ShookII, 543 F.3d at 604.
144 id.
145

Id. at 604-05.

146

Id. at 605 (noting plaintiff's injunction would utilize individual characteristics and

circumstances to determine class member treatment). As an example, the court noted that
plaintiffs ask for an injunction compelling defendants to "cease using restraints, pepper
spray, and electroshock weapons ('tasers') against prisoners exhibiting signs of mental
illness in circumstances that pose a substantial risk of serious harm to such prisoners."
But by its very terms, this prayer for relief asks the district court to craft an injunction
that takes into account the specific circumstances of individual inmates' plights. What
specific mental illnesses place a prisoner at an inordinate risk from the use of the
named implements?
And under what circumstances is this risk exacerbated?
Presumably the "circumstances that pose a substantial risk of serious hann" depend on
the nature and severity of the individual's illness, but where a practice may only be
enjoined by reference to circumstances that vary among class members such as
whether an individual inmate is both showing signs of mental illness and at particular
risk from the use of tasers-class-wide relief may be difficult to come by. Instead,
different injunctions would be required to establish the appropriate behavior towards
different groups of class members.
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of conduct so vague and fluid as to be no standard at all. 147 For example,
the court found the plaintiffs proposed order to require the defendants to
provide "safe and appropriate housing for prisoners with serious mental
health needs" vague because the definition of "safe and appropriate"
depends on the severity of the prisoner's mental illness. 48 The court
conceded that some of the requested relief would not require individual
adjudication; however, ultimately the court denied certification because
the
49
relief sought did not satisfy Rule 65(d)'s specificity requirement. 1
Finally, the court cautioned that plaintiffs' difficulties would be
compounded over time because "the proposed class includes not only
current inmates but future ones as well.' 150 Thus, "to craft an enforceable
injunction aimed at ensuring 'adequate' staffing levels or medication
delivery procedures, the district court would have to be able to ascertain the
aggregate characteristics of the class as whole, and enforcing the injunction

147

See id.(describing plaintiff's claims). In the context of class actions, an "upstream" case

is one in which the focus is on the conduct of the defendants; a "downstream" case is one in
which the focus is on the individual situations of the plaintiffs themselves. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 805, 831-32 (1997) (describing
differences between "downstream" and "upstream" cases). As a general proposition, an upstream
case is more susceptible to certification than a downstream case because it is less likely to require
individualized inquiries. Id. at 832. A price-fixing case is an example of the former, a mass tort
case of the latter. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 394 (1927).
148 ShookII, 543 F.3d at 605.
What is safe for Ms. Mosby, who is suicidal, may not be the same as for Mr. Shook,
who merely requires delivery of his medication. Similarly, "adequate screening and
precautions to prevent self-ham and suicide," does not address a cohesive injury
suffered by the class. Not all mentally ill people are suicidal, and so this form of relief
is overly broad relative to the class as defined, and what constitutes "adequate"
precautions against self-harm will necessarily turn on how and in what ways individual
inmates are predisposed to harm themselves.
Id. (citation omitted).
149 Id. at 605-06 ("At the class certification stage, the injunctive relief sought must be
described in reasonably particular detail such that the court can at least 'conceive of an injunction
that would satisfy [Rule 65(d)'s] requirements,' as well as the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2)."
(quoting Monreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 2004))). Ultimately, the problem was
one of burden and proof:
[T]o satisfy Rule 65(d), the levels of services must ultimately be capable of description
in a sufficiently objective way that both the defendant and the court can determine if
the former is complying, and a class certification motion requesting injunctive relief
that simply prescribes "adequate" or "appropriate" levels of services fails to indicate
how final injunctive relief may be crafted to "describe[ ] in reasonable detail ... the
acts ... required.
Id.at 606 (internal citations omitted).
150 Id.at 606.

26

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

15 1
would require monitoring changes to those characteristics over time."
But these inquiries would require "a wealth of information about the class
not necessary in many other Rule 23(b)(2) class actions." 152 For example, a
court called upon to enforce an injunction would need to ask-and have
answered-questions like these:

How many inmates suffer from serious mental illness at
any particular time?
What specific illnesses are
represented in the class, and in what numbers? What type
of staffing and training is necessary to provide "adequate"
care for the range of illnesses existing 53(or likely to exist) in
the Jail population at any given time?
At this point, all efficiencies typically inherent in class actions would be off
54
the table.
5. Do Class Conflicts Preclude Certification?
It is a commonplace of class-certification law that intra-class
conflicts can defeat certification. 55 But one need review no more than a
handful of cases to discover that only certain types of conflicts actually do
defeat certification. This section aims to uncover the deep-yet often
unarticulated-logic at work here. A few examples will set the stage.
The issue of class adversity is usually framed in one of two ways:
standing and/or divergent interests. 56 As we will see, though, the first is
really just an instantiation of the second. In any event, the standing
argument arises when a putative class representative has a status different
from at least some of the putative class members. 157 An example of this
151 Id.
152 Id.at 605.
153 ShookII, 543 F.3d at 605.
154

See id.

155 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV.

§ 1768 (3d

ed. 2011) ("It is axiomatic that a putative representative cannot adequately protect the class if the
representative's interests are antagonistic to or in conflict with the objectives of those being
represented.").
156 See NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 2:5 ("[S]tanding ... does not automatically entitle the
plaintiff to maintain a class action unless the additional qualifications of a class representative
under Rule 23 [for typicality and adequacy] are also met"). But see Ramirez v. STi Prepaid LLC,
644 F. Supp. 2d 496, 504-05 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting standing and meeting Rule 23 certification

requirements two separate issues).
157 See Hardin v. Harshbarger, 814 F. Supp. 703, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding class
representative lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because representative already personally
achieved relief); see also NEWBERG, supra note 21, § 2:5 (describing standing requirements).
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would be a case in which former employees seek to represent a class
containing current employees. 58 In these cases, the real inquiry should not
be whether there are status differences among class members but, rather,
whether those differences matter-i.e., whether the differences amount to
genuine adverse interests and, even then, whether those adverse interests
are legally cognizable.' 59
For example, in In re FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.
Employment Practices Litigation, 60 the court was called upon to decide
whether-in the context of a case alleging that FedEx had "misclassified"
its drivers as independent contractors instead of as employees-"former
drivers have significantly different interests than do . . . current
contractors.' 6' The defendants argued that "[c]urrent contractors have a
long-term interest in whether they are classified as contractors or
employees, and whether they can obtain what they believe is a more
favorable relationship with FedEx Ground, whereas former contractors
have no such interest."', 62 In other words, it might be that current drivers
would prefer to leave well enough alone because the relief sought, if
granted, would not inure to their benefit and could even harm them. The
court made short work of this argument:
All Tennessee plaintiffs signed the same standard
Operating Agreement and were classified as independent
contractors. The Tennessee plaintiffs were subject to the
same regulations regarding their appearance, trucks,
delivery methods, and working hours. Whether they were
improperly classifiedas independent contractorsaffects all
of them equally, as it entitles both former and current
drivers to additional benefits and compensation as well as
entitling the current drivers to proper classification in the
future. FedEx Ground asserts that current contractors,
unlike former contractors, have a long-term interest in their
classification, and whether they can obtain what they
believe is a more favorable relationship with FedEx
Ground. If the Tennessee plaintiffs are being treated as

158

See Cross v. Nat'l Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1977) ("[T]hat

plaintiffs are no longer employees of the defendant does not deprive them of standing to represent
a class consisting of current and prospective employees.").
159 See Cross, 553 F.2d at 1031.
160 273 F.R.D. 424 (N.D. Ind. 2008), upheld on reconsideration,No. MDL-1700, 2010 WL
597997, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2010).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 438.
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FedEx Ground employees, however, the law requires them
to be classified as such. Current contractors don't have
the option
to be classified as one type and treated as
63
1

another.

Although perhaps stated a bit obliquely, the court's point is an important
one: adversity arising because some class members might choose an illegal
status quo over a legal remedy is not "adversity" in any legally significant
164
sense.
A slightly different-though ultimately related-problem arises
when there is a question of fact concerning the benefits of a class-wide
injunction or declaration. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices
Litigation165 offers a particularly good example of this issue and a possible
(though somewhat question-begging) solution. Plaintiffs brought class
claims for, among other things, injunctive relief against motor fuel
retailers. 66 The gist of plaintiffs' claims was "that because defendants sell
motor fuel for a specified price per gallon without disclosing or adjusting
for temperature expansion, they are liable under state law theories which
include breach of contract, breach of warranty, fraud, and consumer
protection. " 167 To analyze the certification issues presented by these
allegations, the court engaged in a nested two-part analysis,
beginning with
68
a focus on "two independent but related requirements.,,1
Under this rubric, the court first requires that plaintiffs demonstrate
that the allegations of the defendant's actions or inactions applied to all
class members.169 Second, the plaintiffs must show that injunctive relief
suits the whole class. 7° Collectively, these requirements insist upon
cohesion of class members and their injuries. 171 This relationship entails a
further two-part evaluation. First, plaintiffs must show that the proposed
class is sufficiently cohesive that any class-wide injunctive relief will
satisfy the requirement of Rule 65(d) that every injunction "state its terms
specifically; and describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained

Id. (emphasis added).
164 See id.
163

165

271 F.R.D. 221 (D. Kan. 2010).

166

Id. at 226-27.

167

Id. at 223.
Id. at 224 (setting forth certification analysis).
Id. at 224-25 (quoting Shook II, 543 F.3d 597, 604 (10th Cir. 2008)) (internal citations

168
169

omitted) (detailing steps of court's evaluation).
170 In re Motor Fuel, 271 F.R.D. at 224-25.
171 Id. at 225.
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or required." 7 2 Second, plaintiffs must show that class members' injuries
are "sufficiently similar" that they can be remedied in a single injunction
without differentiating between class members. 173 All told, then, "to satisfy
Rule 23(b)(2) at the class certification stage, plaintiffs must describe in
reasonably particular detail the injunctive relief which they seek so that the
Court can at least conceive of an injunction which would satisfy the
requirements of Rule 65(d) and Rule 23(b)(2).' 74
Against this legal framework, the defendants set facts suggesting
that the putative class was hopelessly conflicted "because not every
purported class member wants temperature adjustment of retail motor fuel
sales.', 175 More specifically, the defendants asserted "that because class
members may disagree whether they would benefit from injunctive relief
requiring mandatory ATC [automatic temperature correction] at retail,
plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the class.' 76
The court thus
correctly recognized that it faced a potential question of intra-class conflict
and that, consequently, its principal task was
to determine whether this
77
conflict was merely apparent or actually real. 1
Lurking in the background of the court's analysis was a potentially
controlling Tenth Circuit precedent, Albertson 's, Inc. v. Amalgamated
Sugar Co. 178 In Albertson 's, the named plaintiffs sought to represent a
class of direct purchasers of beet sugar in an antitrust action. 179 As relief,
the plaintiffs prayed, in part, for an injunction regarding the method that
defendants used to calculate freight charges. 80 The district court declined
to certify a class as to this question and the appellate court affirmed.' 8'
172

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)).

The pertinent portion of Rule 65(d) states as

follows:

(1) Contents. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order must:
(A) state the reasons why it issued;

(B)state its terms specifically; and
(C) describe in reasonable detail-and not by referring to the complaint or other
document the act or acts restrained or required.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1).
173 In re Motor Fuel, 271 F.R.D. at 225 (quoting DG ex rel. Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d
1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010)).
174 Id.
175 Id. at231.
176

Id. at 232.

177

See id. at 231-33.

503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 460.
1"oId. at 462-63.
178
179

181Id.

30

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

Both Albertson courts reasoned that although a "mere disparity" in benefits
to class members is not a bar to certification, members of the putative class
were business competitors, and the requested injunction would alter the
competitive position of these members. 18 2 In short, the court identified the
case as one presenting a "winners and losers"
scenario, which is often
183
certification.
deny
to
reason
good
a
be
to
found
So the question that the court faced in the Motor Fuel case resolved
into this: is the case one in which the requested injunctive relief would

create winners and losers? 18 4 To answer this question, the court first
distinguished Albertson 's, finding that the putative class was not made up
of business competitors and that defendants failed to argue the potential for
some class members to profit over others due to varying circumstances. 185
Rather, according to the court, the defendants asserted no more than "class
members hold differing opinions" as to whether the injunction would
benefit the class as a whole. 1 6 But this is not a class-phase issue: "the
alleged difference of opinion goes to the ultimate merits of the case.
Before plaintiffs may obtain injunctive relief requiring defendants to install
ATC, they must prove that the requested relief will benefit the class as a
whole.' 87 In other words, there is a fact of the matter, and that fact (i.e.,
whether ATC at retail would result in higher or lower fuel prices) is a
common question of fact.' 88 Accordingly, the court held that there were no

182

Id. at 464.

183 Albertson's, 503 F.2d at 464.; see also Campbell v. City of Chicago, No. 83-C-3884,

1984 WL 21980, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1984) (denying certification because not all members
had competitive interest in abolishing licensing system); Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68
F.R.D. 443, 452-53 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (denying certification because past customers lacked present
customers' interest in harmonious relationship with defendants). But see Sollenbarger v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 121 F.R.D. 417, 430 (D.N.M. 1988) (certifying class because
there would be no disparate competition effect and no benefits disparity).
184 See In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 221, 233 (D. Kan.
2010) (describing question before court); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pham., Inc., 350 F.3d
1181, 1190 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating certification improper where some class members benefit
from conduct that named plaintiff deems illegal).
185

In re Motor Fuel, 271 F.R.D. at 233 ("[B]ecause the named representatives and class

members were business competitors, the case involved much more than a 'mere disparity' in
benefit.").
186 Id. (emphasis added).
187 Id. ("If the evidence shows that mandating ATC would actually ham the class, plaintiffs
will not prevail in their request for injunctive relief.").
188 Id. The defendants also argued that class members who regularly purchased fuel at cool
temperatures would be harmed by the injunction and, thus, object to ATC. Id. at 233 n.21. But
they offered this objection as a hypothetical, so the court was able to brush it aside as speculation.
Id. Even with actual evidence in support of this objection, it is likely the court would still have
certified the class based on its earlier finding that any "difference of opinion goes to the ultimate
merits of the case," namely whether an injunction would benefit the class as a whole. Id. at 233.
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conflicts that would (1) render the named plaintiffs inadequate under Rule
23(a)(4), or (2) show the class to lack "cohesiveness" of the sort that would
make certification inappropriate under Rule 23(b)(2).18 9
But, as noted at the outset, this really begs the question. For if the
class members disagree about the efficacy of the requested relief, then there
is adversity in the class. What the court tacitly found, then, is that
essentially uninformed differences of "opinion" are not cognizable as
adverse interests. 190 In other words, disagreement over how the facts will
turn out doesn't mean that the facts are not common-i.e., they are what
they are, and they will ultimately be found by the ordinary workings of the
judicial process.
Sometimes, though, there is not a fact of the matter-or at least not
one that can be readily discovered with reference to objective, neutral
criteria. Two threads emerge here. First, there are the relatively easy cases
in which a defendant alleges that there is widespread disagreement amongst
the class as to the desirability of an action that the defendant has taken. 191
However, that argument is a red herring. A common example of this arises
when a union raises its members' dues and a member challenges that act on
behalf of himself and all other members. 192 In one recurring pattern, the
defendant argues that many members would prefer not to have their dues
raised, but the gist of the plaintiff's claim is that the dues increase resulted
from an illegal vote. 193 This tactic confounds a question of whether the
class members have different preferences (e.g., whether they think a dues
increase is a good idea) with a question of legality. Courts must disregard
class disagreements where those disagreements exist because some
members would prefer the result of an illegal act. 194 But, as we've seen
before in cases like Pico, there are other cases in which the class adversity
actually is the result of divergent preferences.1 95
Even in a case in which the central dispute is one over the legality
of an act, courts often show sensitivity to the divergent interests of class
189 Id. at 233, 235.

190 See In re Motor Fuel, 271 F.R.D. at 233 (noting difference of opinion must go to ultimate

merits of case).
191 See Stolz v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 620 F. Supp. 396, 405 (D. Nev. 1985)
(noting members dues increase disagreement immaterial because suit claimed statutory violation
of voting process).
192 See Gates v. Dalton, 67 F.R.D. 621, 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (examining whether interests
of
class antagonistic).
193 See Stolz, 620 F. Supp. at 405 (noting alleged antagonism insufficient to prevent plaintiff
from being named class representative); Hummel v. Brennan, 83 F.R.D. 141, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(identifying antagonism issue for court's determination).
194 See supra Part III.C.3 (discussing cases where class disagreements may lack good faith).
195 See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text (describing Pico decision).
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members. This is particularly so where the alleged conduct presents a
debatable question of classification.196 Horton v. Goose Creek Independent
School District197 is often cited as representative of this type. 198 In this
case, the named plaintiffs sued a school district, alleging that the district's
use of contraband-sniffing dogs violated the civil rights of students. 199 The
Fifth Circuit conceded that a definite possibility existed for disagreement
among the class justifying denial of certification 0 0 Despite this, the court
found that "[t]hough some members may disagree with the named
plaintiffs, their position has been asserted energetically and forcefully by
the defendant, which has argued that the school administration must be able
to use these searches to combat a serious drug problem." 20 ' Additionally,
the court opined that denial of certification would be of little substantive
impact because "the stare decisis effect of our decision that the sniffing
procedures as they relate to the students are unconstitutional will, as a
practical matter, put an end to all searches. , 202 Finally, in an explicit nod to
"disagreement among class members over appropriate
relief," the court
20 3
ordered "certification on the issue of liability only."
These justifications seem small in the face of genuine conflicts.
For example, it is odd to certify a named plaintiff as adequate to "protect
20 4
the interests of the class" by ceding that responsibility to the defendant.
And the stare decisis argument is-ironically enough-one typically
deployed to demonstrate that a class action is unnecessary. 20 5 Finally, that
the class could be certified as to only a single issue often signals that the
class device will not lead to the efficiencies that are the raisond'otre of the

196 See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF

LAW: A THEORY OF

LEGAL REASONING 141 (2005) (considering question of classification). MacCormick discusses
"the question whether a given situation counts as belonging in a relevant category for purposes of
applying a legislative text" (or any legal rule). Id.
197 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 473 (identifying issue before the court).
200 Id. at 485. The court looked specifically at the possible disagreements among class
members, which included "the chance that some class members support the canine search
program," and the attendant "possibility of antagonistic interests." Id.
201 Id.at 487.
202 Horton, 690 F.2d at 487 n.32.
203 Id. at 488 n.33.
204 Yet courts still employ this procedure in certifying such cases. See Curley v. Brignoli,
Curley & Roberts Assocs., 915 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1990) ("When the interests of antagonistic
class members are adequately represented by the class' opponents, the requirements of due
process are satisfied such that a class can be certified."); Horton, 690 F.2d at 487 (finding
defendant adequately represented dissenting class members when defendant vigorously opposed
certification and collusion unlikely).
205 See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing necessity of class action).
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device.20 6 Of course, the court was no doubt seeking a pragmatic solution
to a difficult problem, and its approach is unlikely to work much mischief
in cases in which the defendant is a government agency. Nonetheless, as
the Horton court confirmed, courts should be reluctant to extend this
approach to ordinary civil litigation, in which the defendant cannot
necessarily be counted on to defend vigorously the positions of dissenting
class members.20 7
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
No single heuristic device can settle, once and for all, the question
of whether any particular case is suitable for class-action treatment under
Rule 23(b)(2). That requires a decisive act of judgment by a judge. But
such a device can, and this Article argues should, guide this decisive act.
When faced with a motion to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) involving
a request for declaratory or injunctive relief, a court should consider seven
(somewhat overlapping) questions:
1) Should the case be a derivative action rather than a
class action?
2) Will an individual action achieve the same ends?
3)

Is the defendant's conduct generally applicable to
everyone in the class?

4)

Are there conflicts among members of the class?

5)

Is the dispute "political" rather than "legal"?

6) Is injunctive or declaratory relief appropriate?

206

See generally Laura J. Hines, The DangerousAllure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND.

L.J. 567, 609 (2004) (examining problems and limitations of class actions); see also supra note 9
(highlighting intentions and goals of typicality requirement for class).
207 See 690 F.2d at 487 ("In many cases, we would hesitate to rely on the opponent of the
class to represent the views of dissenting class members."). Compare Reese v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 209 F.R.D. 231, 233 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (following Horton and finding dissenting class
members' interests sufficiently safeguarded by interests of governmental defendants), with
Forsyth v. Lake LBJ Inv. Corp., 903 S.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (declining to
allow defendants to represent dissident absent class members). Forsyth differed from Horton
because Forsyth involved actual intra-class antagonism rather than the mere possibility of
antagonism. See Forsyth, 903 S.W.2d at 151.
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7) If there are disagreements among members of the
class, are they of a character that renders certification
inappropriate?
If the court is convinced that the answers to these questions are no, no, yes,
no, no, yes, and no, then it can move forward more or less assured that it is
not wading into a morass of competing belief systems, personal political
preferences, or matters of nothing so much as taste. Cast in reverse, the
court can rest easy that-whatever the ultimate outcome-it is taking up a
case on a classwide basis that squares with what Rule 23(b)(2) intends:
redressing claims based on facts which-if proven-have legal
significance that is beyond debate.

